ABSTRACT
Introduction
A decision maker typically faces a lot of uncertainty when deciding over a course of action. For example, investors know they face the risk of losing all their money. Students do not know which University degree maximises their future job market prospects. Consumers do not know which product offers the best price/quality ratio... To be more specific, suppose someone has the opportunity to invest in a project whose returns are positively correlated with the "general future health of the U.S. economy". Obviously, assessing the future state of the U.S. economy is a hard task and no human being is smart enough to make an errorless prediction about it. However, investors do not live like Robinson Crusoe -isolated on an island. Instead, they realise that the economy is populated by many other potential investors who all face the same type of risk. Moreover, they know that if they were to meet and exchange opinions, this would enable them to reduce their forecasting error. But if investors really care about one another's opinions, how will this information be disseminated throughout the economy?
Casual observation of everyday life suggests there are two different channels through which investors may learn about one another's opinions: one may learn through words or one may learn through actions. With the former, we have in mind a situation in which one investor simply tells her opinion to (possibly many) other investors. For example, every now and then managing directors of important companies appear in the media and express their opinions on a wide range of issues such as future technological developments, future oil prices, future market growth, etc... Some institutions are even specialised in collecting and summarising the opinions of a large number of market participants. For example, the Munich-based IFO institute for economic research releases a quarterly index reflecting the business confidence of the average German investor. With learning through actions, we mean that if someone invests in a one-million-dollar project in the U.S., this reveals her confidence in the American business climate.
In this paper, we analyse the interaction between both communication channels. More specifically, we consider the following set-up: N players must take an investment decision and possess a private, imperfect signal concerning the future state of the world. Investment is only profitable in the good state. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the returns of the investment project only depend on the state of the world. Hence, for efficiency reasons one would want to have all players truthfully exchanging their signals. Players can invest in two periods. In the second period, everyone observes how many agents invested at time one. One randomly drawn 1 player (the sender) is asked to divulge her private information (i.e. her signal) to the other players (the receivers) prior to the first investment period, and we compute all monotone equilibria 1 of our game. We first show that both communication channels do not co-exist peacefully, in the sense that there does not exist a monotone equilibrium in which the sender truthfully announces her private information and in which subsequently a lot of information is generated through actions. This tension between both communication channels manifests itself differently depending on the surplus generated by the project: for low surplus projects the unique monotone equilibrium is the pooling one 2 , while for high surplus projects there also exists an equilibrium in which the sender truthfully reveals her private information but in which "little" information is transmitted through actions.
The intuition behind this result goes as follows: in our model expected payoffs are driven by the relative number of optimists in the economy (the higher the proportion of optimists in the population, the higher the probability that the world is in the good state). At time two all players observe the number of period-one investments and use this knowledge to get an "idea" of the proportion of optimists in the economy. This updating process depends on the period-one investment strategies 3 (which are affected by the sender's message). If the investment only generates a low surplus, pessimists will -independently of the sender's message -never invest in the first period. Both sender's types then want to send the message which makes the optimists invest with as large a probability as possible 4 . Thus both sender's types share the same preferences over the receivers' actions, and therefore no information can be transmitted through cheap talk. For high surplus projects, however, this intuition is incomplete. In that case all players face a positive gain of investing after receiving the message "I am an optimist". If a player then believes that everyone will invest at time one, it's optimal for her to do so too (i.e. an informational cascade 5 in which everyone invests is ignited by the arrival of a favourable message). In our model this informational cascade induces a pessimist to send the message "I am a pessimist": if she were to deviate and sent instead the message "I am an optimist", she wouldn't be able to learn anything about the proportion of optimists in the population and would never invest. An optimist faces a high opportunity cost of waiting, and independently of her message, invests at time one. Hence, she cannot gain by sending the message "I am a pessimist".
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We next argue that our analysis allows us to draw some positive and normative conclusions. In particular, we show that an investment subsidy, by artificially increasing the surplus generated by the project, promotes truthful revelation of private information. However, this does not mean that an investment subsidy always increases welfare: a social planner knows that if the subsidy induces truthful revelation, this comes at the cost of less information transmission through actions. In the paper we show that a social planner may even want to tax investments to cause information to be revealed through actions instead of words. Finally, we also show that a more able sender (i.e. a sender possessing a more precise signal) has more incentives to truthfully reveal her private information than a less able one.
This paper belongs to the literature on informational cascades (see among others Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch (1992) (BHW hereafter), Chamley and Gale (1994) , Chamley (2004a) , for an excellent overview and introduction to this literature see Chamley (2004b) . Those papers assume away any preplay communication and study the efficiency properties of social learning (learning takes place through actions only). Our results provide a justification for this approach: for low surplus projects, no information can be transmitted through words because players want to influence their future learning capabilities. In those papers the public information is the consequence of some costly actions undertaken by the early movers: for example a second mover knows that the first mover is an optimist because she spent money to undertake a new investment project. Hence, in those papers the credibility of the public information is not an issue. In this paper it is costless to send public information, and its credibility must therefore be carefully checked. Those papers show how an informational cascade develops as a consequence of the arrival of some early (and credible) information. In this paper, we show that the causality can also be reversed: it is the informational cascade, by reducing the gain of sending the message "I am an optimist", which causes the public information to be credible. Doyle (2002) also introduces a social planner in a dynamic investment model with information externalities but without cheap talk. In contrast to our paper, pessimistic players do not possess an investment option and therefore never invest. Hence, Doyle's model does not feature an equilibrium in which pessimistic players invest at time one and consequently blur the information contained in all players' time-one investment decisions. Therefore, in his model one would never want to tax investments. Gill and Sgroi (2003) analyse a set-up in which a, possibly "optimistic", "pessimistic" or "unbiased", sender is asked whether or not to endorse a product. Upon hearing the sender's message, receivers decide sequentially whether or not to buy the product. Hence, in their model receivers also learn through other receivers' actions and through the sender's message. In contrast to our paper, the authors assume that the sender does not want to learn about the receivers' types (because, for instance, she already consumed the product and received her payoff). Therefore, she cannot gain by misrepresenting her private information.
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Obviously, this is not the first paper to investigate the credibility of cheap talk statements. In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) already analysed the issue of information transmission through cheap talk. However, in their model the receiver chooses an action which influences both player's payoffs after having received a message from the informed sender. In our model the sender first sends a message and then plays a (waiting) game with the receivers. Farrell (1987 Farrell ( , 1988 , Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Baliga and Morris (2002) also assume that both players play a game after having received or sent a message. However, they consider a very different game: in Farrel (1987 Farrel ( , 1988 and Baliga and Morris (2002) , the communication stage is followed by a coordination game, while in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) both players engage in a bargaining game after the communication stage. As we consider a (very) different game, we also get very different results: Crawford and Sobel (1982) have shown how the credibility of cheap talk statements are undermined when the sender and the receiver have different preferences over the optimal action, Baliga and Morris (2002) argued that positive spillovers impede information exchange, while we show how social learning may destroy incentives for truthtelling (and how informational cascades help in restoring these incentives).
This paper is organised as follows. In section two, we present our two-stage game. In the third section, we take the players' posteriors as given and solve for all monotone stable continuation equilibria. The proofs of the results stated in this section tend to be quite lengthy and we therefore decided not to include them in this paper. We refer the interested reader to Gossner and Melissas (2003) . We next compute equilibrium strategies in the sender-receiver game (section four). We first show how the credibility of cheap talk may be undermined when players can postpone their investment decisions (Proposition 4). Next, we show how this credibility can be restored by an informational cascade (Proposition 5). In section 5, we discuss some normative and positive implications of our theory. Final comments are summarised in the sixth and final section.
The Model
Assume that a population of N ≥ 5 risk neutral players must decide whether to invest in a risky project or not. V ∈ {1, 0} denotes the value of the investment project. The state of the economy is described by Θ ∈ {G, B}. If Θ = G the good state prevails and V = 1 whereas if Θ = B, the economy is in a bad state and V = 0. The prior probability that Θ = G equals 1/2. The cost of the investment project is denoted by c. Each player receives a private, conditionally independent signal concerning the realised state of the world. Formally, player l's signal s l ∈ {g, b} (l = 1, ..., N ) where Pr(g|G) = Pr(b|B) = p > 1/2. We assume that:
A1 implies that a player who received signal g is, a priori, willing to invest (Pr(G|g) = p > c), and that a player who received a signal b is, a priori, not willing to invest (Pr(G|b) = 1 − p < c). Henceforth, we call a player who received a good (bad) signal an optimist (pessimist) 8 . If c ≤ 1/2 (c > 1/2), we call the investment opportunity a high (low) surplus project. We analyse the stage game that unfolds as follows:
-1 The state of nature is realised and players receive signals, 0 A randomly selected player i is asked to report her signal. Her message,ŝ i ∈ {g, b}, is made public to all the other players, 1 All players make investment decisions, 8 Observe that in our model all players are Bayesian rational: optimists (pessimists) do not overestimate (underestimate) the probability that Θ = G. Hence, our definitions differ from the ones that are used by behavioural economists. However, these definitions are intuitive and should not confuse the reader.
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2 All players observe who invested at time one, and those who haven't invested yet make new investment decisions, 3 All players learn the true state of the world. Payoffs are received and the game ends.
In the first stage (time zero) player i (the sender) influences the time-one posteriors of the remaining players (the receivers). Henceforth, we call the second stage the waiting game (or the continuation game). At time one, player l must choose an action, a l , from the set {invest, wait}. At time two all players who waited at time one must choose an action from the set {invest, not invest}. Each player only possesses one investment opportunity, so a period-one investor cannot invest in a second project at time two. Investments are irreversible. If a player does not invest in any of the two periods, she gets zero. Investment decisions at period one are represented by a N -vector x where the l-th coordinate equals 1 if player l invested at time one and zero otherwise. δ denotes the discount factor. We let h t (t = 0, 1, 2) denote the history of the game at time t. Thus h 0 = {∅}, h 1 =ŝ i and h 2 = (ŝ i , x). H t denotes the set of all possible histories at time t, and the set of histories is H = 2 t=0 H t . A symmetric behavioural strategy for the receivers is a function ρ : {g, b} × H → [0, 1] with the interpretation that ρ(s j , h t ) represents the probability of investing at date t given s j and h t (j = 1, ..., N and j = i). For instance, ρ(g, b) is the probability that an optimistic receiver invests at time one given thatŝ i = b, and ρ(b, g) is the probability that a pessimistic receiver invests at time one given thatŝ i = g. Since each player can only invest once, ρ(s j , h 2 ) = 0 if player j invested at time one, and ρ(s j , h 0 ) = 0 since no one can invest at time zero. A behavioural strategy for the sender is a function σ : {g, b} × H → [0, 1]. σ(g, h 0 ) (σ(b, h 0 )) represents the probability with which an optimistic (pessimistic) sender sendsŝ i = g. σ(·, h 1 ) (σ(·, h 2 )) represents the probability that player i invests at date one (two). As before, σ(·, h 2 ) = 0 if the sender invested in the first period.
When solving our game, we rely on four equilibrium selection criteria. First, we require a candidate equilibrium to belong to the class of the perfect Bayesian equilibria. Henceforth, σ * (·) (ρ * (·)) denotes the value taken by σ(·) (ρ(·)) in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE strategies and beliefs (concerning the other players' types) must be such that (i) the sender cannot gain by choosing a σ = σ * given her beliefs and given ρ * , (ii) receivers cannot gain by choosing a ρ = ρ * given their beliefs and given σ * and (iii) beliefs must be computed using Bayes's rule whenever possible. As usual, a pooling equilibrium is a PBE in which σ * (g, h 0 ) = σ * (b, h 0 ). In that case the messageŝ i = g is as likely to come from an optimistic as from a pessimistic sender. Hence, in that case messages have no informational content and do not affect posteriors. For the sake of concreteness (and without loss of generality), we assume that σ * (g, h 0 ) ≥ σ * (b, h 0 ). This assumption merely defines messageŝ i = g as the one which influences posteriors in a (weakly) favourable way. Under this assumption, a separating equilibrium is a PBE in which σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1 and σ * (b, h 0 ) = 0. Note that at time one the posterior of the receivers may differ from the sender's. Therefore, we do not impose σ * (g, h 1 ) to be equal to ρ * (g, h 1 ). Similarly, we allow σ * (b, h 1 ) to be different from ρ * (b, h 1 ). Second, we restrict ourselves to the class of the monotone strategies. Consider players l and l (where l or l may be the sender). Let q ≡ Pr(G|s l ,ŝ i ) (respectively q ≡ Pr(G|s l ,ŝ i )) denote player l's (respectively player l 's) time-one posterior. Strategies are said to be monotone if they possess the following two properties: 1) if q = q , then Pr(l invests at time one) = Pr(l invests at time one), 2) if Pr(l invests at time one) > Pr(l invests at time one), then q > q . Remark that from the first property, monotone strategies are symmetric. Note also that the first property implies that whenever the sender's message is uninformative, the sender invests at time one with the same probability as a receiver of the same type, which need not hold in symmetric strategies. Property two implies that the time-one investment probabilities (weakly) increase in the time-one posteriors. Below, we will explain in more detail our need to focus on monotone strategies.
Third, we discard unstable equilibria. With "unstable" we refer to the traditional notion according to which an equilibrium is unstable if a small change in the investment probability of the other players induces a change in player l's optimal investment probability with the same sign and with a greater magnitude. This equilibrium selection criterion has also been used in the study of coordination problems (see, for example, Cooper and John (1988) and Chamley (2003) ). Chamley (2004a) already noted their existence in games with social learning. This requirement will also be explained in more detail below.
Finally, we require every candidate equilibrium to be robust to the introduction of an -reputational cost. More specifically, we assume that with probability 1 receivers detect any "lie" (i.e. the optimistic sender who sends messageŝ i = b, or the pessimistic sender who sends messageŝ i = g) from the sender, in which case she suffers a reputational cost equal to 2 . It is important to note that 1 is unrelated to the sender's behaviour in the continuation game. This assumption ensures that the sender's behaviour in the continuation game is only driven by informational reasons (and not by her desire to "mask" a past lie). Let ≡ 1 . 2 and we assume that represents an arbitrary small, but strictly positive, number. With this reputational cost, an optimistic sender prefers to send a favourable to an unfavourable message (as will become clear below, in the absence of this , she would be indifferent between the two messages).
A monotone stable perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MSPBE) is a tuple of strategies and beliefs which satisfy our four equilibrium selection criteria.
Strategic Waiting
Before proving the existence of a PBE in our game, we analyse equilibrium behaviour in the continuation game. We restrict ourselves to the class of the monotone stable continuation equilibria (MSCE). Henceforth,σ(·) (ρ(·)) denotes the value taken by σ(·) (ρ(·)) in a MSCE. A MSCE is identical to a MSPBE except that we do not require the sender to chooseσ(g, h 0 ) andσ(b, h 0 ) optimally given her beliefs and given equilibrium behaviour in the continuation game. Stated differently, in a MSCE we do not endogenise the receivers' time-one posteriors. Instead, we just treat them as if they were exogenous and analyse equilibrium behaviour in the continuation game given players' posteriors. Note that every MSPBE is a MSCE, while the contrary need not hold.
In the appendix we characterise the set of MSCE's for all possible time-one posteriors. To avoid a lengthy and technical exposition, below we "only" intuitively explain our most important results. Moreover, when providing an intuition we often restrict attention to the limit case in which (i) the sender is an optimist who truthfully reports her private information and (ii) receivers compute their posteriors under the assumption of truthful revelation. In this limit case optimistic receivers possess two favourable pieces of information and compute Pr(
Pessimistic receivers possess two contradictory pieces of information and compute Pr(
Our model is void of any competition effects or positive network externalities. Hence, a player's expected gain of investing is solely determined by the relative number of optimists (as compared to the number of pessimists) in the population. Denote by n the random number of optimists in our population. The higher n, the higher Pr(G|n) and the higher the expected gain of investing. Unfortunately, by postponing one's investment decision, players observe x, the vector of time-one investment decisions, instead of n. Hence, at time two all players who waited at time one face an inference problem: on the basis of x they must try to get "as precise an idea" about n.
As we only consider symmetric strategies, player i does not care about who invests, but rather in how many players invest. Therefore, from the sender's point of view all information contained in x can be summarised by k s (the number of receivers who invest at time one).
9 Similarly, from a receiver's point of view all information contained in x can be summarised by k (the number of remaining receivers who invest at time one) and a i (the time-one action of the sender).
We thus continue our analysis by working with k, k s and a i . If player j waits, she observes k and a i and invests if Pr(G|q, k, a i ) ≥ c. Hence, for a given k and a i player j's payoff equals max{0, Pr(G|q, k, a i ) − c}. Of course, player j cannot ex ante know the realization of k and a i . Therefore, player j's ex ante gain of waiting (net of discounting costs), W (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ), equals
where
To gain some insight behind equations (1) and (2) it is useful to consider equation (1) when q = q (i.e. when player j is an optimist who believes the sender to be optimistic as well), σ 1 = (0, 0) (i.e. when the sender invests with probability zero), and ρ 1 = (0, ρ(g, g)) (i.e. pessimistic receivers wait, while the optimistic ones invest with probability ρ(·)). Equation (1) can then be rewritten as
Suppose that ρ(g, g) = 0. If player j waits, she will then observe zero investments and compute Pr(G|q, 0, wait) = q. This is intuitive: player j, independently of n, always observes zero period-one investments. Stated differently, if ρ(g, g) = 0, it's as if she doesn't receive any additional information concerning the realised state of the world. Therefore she has no reason to change her posterior and Pr(G|q, 0, wait) = q. Hence,
Suppose now that ρ(g, g) = 1. Then, in the next period player j learns how many optimists are present in the economy (i.e. n = k+2) 10 . At time two player j computes Pr(G|n), and invests if Pr(G|n) ≥ c. As before, player j cannot ex ante know how many optimists are present in the economy, and therefore
Proof: See appendix. To gain some intuition behind Lemma 1, we explain why ∀c ∈ (1 − p, p), W (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)) > q − c whenever our economy consists of at least five players. We can rewrite player j's gain of investing as follows:
Suppose ρ 1 = (0, 1) and assume that player j decides to wait at time one and then to invest unconditionally (i.e. to invest at time two independently of n). The above equality merely states that investing at time one is payoff-equivalent (net of discounting costs) to unconditionally investing at time two. Equation (4) learns us that waiting (when ρ 1 = (0, 1)) is equivalent to making an optimal conditional second-period investment decision. Observe that n cannot take a value lower than two because both players j and i are assumed to be optimists. If Pr(G|n = 2) is higher or equal than c, then the optimal conditional second-period investment decision always coincides with unconditionally investing at time two. This means that q − c is equal to W (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)). Hence, W (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)) is strictly greater than q − c if (and only if) Pr(G|n = 2) < c. In this model all players possess a signal of the same precision. Therefore, ∀ c ∈ (1 − p, p), it takes three pessimistic receivers to refrain an optimist, who learned through the sender's message that s i = g, from investing (and therefore N must be greater or equal than five).
To focus on the interesting parameter range, we assume:
The first inequality of A2 puts a lower bound on the discount factor δ such that an optimistic receiver, who learned (through the sender's message) that s i = g, faces a positive option value of waiting (i.e. if player j expects all the optimistic receivers to invest and all the other players to wait, then she rather waits). The first inequality ensures thus thatρ(g, g) < 1. The second inequality ensures thatρ(g, g) > 0.
, and there exists a value ρ c (q) such that the inequality becomes strict whenever
Proof: See appendix. From Lemma 2 follows:
, where the inequality becomes strict when-
Proof: See appendix. A slightly different version of Corollary 1 was already proven in Chamley and Gale (1994, Proposition 2) . To understand the intuition behind Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, compare the following two "scenarios". In scenario one all optimistic receivers randomise with probability ρ (g, g), in scenario two all optimistic receivers randomise with probability ρ(g, g) < ρ (g, g). Denote by n r the number of optimistic receivers. Call k (respectively k) the number of players investing at time one when n r − 1 optimistic receivers invest with probability ρ (g, g) (respectively ρ(g, g)). Now, having n r − 1 players investing with probability ρ(g, g) is ex ante equivalent to the following two-stage experiment: first let all n r − 1 players invest with probability ρ (g, g), next let all k investors re-randomise with probability
. Therefore the statistic k is generated by adding noise to the statistic k . Therefore k is a sufficient statistic for k. From Blackwell's value of information theorem (1951) we know that this implies that
. Lemma 2 states that the inequality becomes strict once ρ (g, g) passes a critical threshold level.
Stated differently, ρ(g, g) captures the ex ante amount of information produced by the optimistic receivers. The higher ρ(g, g), the easier one can infer n out of k (this can best be seen by comparing the two polar cases where ρ(g, g) = 0 and ρ(g, g) = 1 (see above)) and thus the higher the ex ante gain of waiting.
Proposition 1 If the investment generates a low surplus and if Pr(G|s
, there exists a unique MSCE in which the sender and the pessimistic receivers wait while the optimistic receivers invest with probabilityρ(g, g) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: See appendix. To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1 we focus on our limit case in which Pr(G|g, g) = q. As c > 1/2 = Pr(G|b,ŝ i = g), no pessimist wants to invest at time one. Suppose the optimistic receivers anticipate that the optimistic sender waits. On the basis of A2 and Lemma 2, it is easy to see that there exists then a uniqueρ(g, g) which makes them indifferent between investing and waiting. This is depicted in Graph 1.
Graph 1: Existence of a MSCE in whichρ(g, g) ∈ (0, 1).
We now explain why the optimistic sender wants to wait given that the remaining optimistic receivers invest with probabilityρ(g, g). Consider therefore the following Lemma (and its first Corollary).
Proof: See appendix. Lemma 3 is illustrated in Graph 2.
Graph 2: The effect of a change in q on q − c and W (·).
Suppose player j anticipates that Θ = G with some probability q. As before, Graph 2 shows the existence of a uniqueρ(·) where the gain of investing equals the gain of waiting. Suppose now that for some exogenous reason player j becomes "more optimistic" in the sense that she now anticipates that Θ = G with probability q > q. An increase in q shifts the gain of waiting upwards for two different reasons: (i) it increases the likelihood that Pr(G|q, k, a i ) > c and thus that player j will get a nonzero expected utility and (ii) it increases her expected gain of investing whenever player j does so. However, the presence of δ in front of W (q, ·) (and not in front of q − c) dampens this increase in δW (q, ·), which explains Lemma 3.
Corollary 2 Suppose the sender and the pessimistic receivers wait
The Corollary is also illustrated on Graph 2: as the upward shift of the gain of investing dominates the one of the gain of waiting,ρ(·) must increase to make an optimistic receiver indifferent between investing and waiting. We now know enough to understand why the optimistic sender wants to wait given that Pr(G|g, g) = q and that all optimistic receivers invest with probabilityρ(g, g). Two different reasons lie at the root of this finding: the first one is due to the fact that the sender observes k s instead of k, the second one is due to the fact that p < q. To illustrate the first reason suppose the sender's posterior probability that Θ = G equals the one of the optimistic receivers. One can think of the statistics k and k s as follows. Let the n r optimistic receivers invest with probabilityρ(·). Next, construct k as follows: if player j invested 11 , k = k s −1, otherwise k = k s . Hence, k s is a sufficient statistic for k and, thus, player i's gain of waiting cannot be lower than player j's. To illustrate the second reason, suppose that if the sender waits, she observes k instead of k s . Call a the probability with which the optimistic receivers must invest such that p − c = δW (p, (0, a)) (i.e. such that an optimistic sender is indifferent between investing and waiting). As q > p, from Corollary 2 we know thatρ(g, g) > a. From Corollary 1 this implies that p − c < δW (p, (0,ρ(g, g))).
Corollary 3 Under A2, q − c < δW (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)).
Proof: A2 states, among others, that q − c < δW (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)). From Lemma 3 we know that the downward shift of the gain of investing dominates the one of the gain of waiting. Q.E.D.
In words, Corollary 3 states that if a player who possesses the highest possible posterior faces a positive option value of waiting, then this will also be true for all less optimistic ones.
Proposition 2 There does not exist a MSCE in which the optimistic sender, after having sent an unfavourable message, gets a payoff strictly higher than p − c − .
11 Remind that player j is an optimistic receiver who is indifferent between investing and waiting and who, therefore, invests with probabilityρ(·).
Proof: See appendix. As the optimistic sender "lied", she suffers an -reputational cost. Thus, if she invests, she gets p − c − . If she waits, she gets δW (p,ρ 1 ) − . Hence, if her payoff strictly exceeds p − c − , this means that she strictly prefers to wait. Suppose there exists a MSCE in whichσ(g, b) = 0. As she sent an unfavourable message, she is the most "optimistic" player in our economy (i.e. Pr(G|b,ŝ i = b) < Pr(G|g,ŝ i = b) ≤ p). As we restrict attention to monotone strategies (in particular this implies that time-one investment probabilities must weakly increase in time-one posteriors)ρ(g, b) ≤σ(g, b) = 0. Clearly, this cannot be a MSCE as the optimistic sender, anticipating that no receiver will invest at time one, then strictly prefers to invest. In our companion paper we prove that if the optimistic sender sendsŝ i = b, there exists a unique MSCE in whichσ(g, b) > 0. This implies that her payoff can then not exceed p − c − .
The explanation above also underscores our need to focus on monotone strategies. Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 already establish that, in equilibrium, the time-one investment probabilities of the receivers (weakly) increase in their time-one posteriors. However, consider a candidate continuation equilibrium in whichρ(g, b) ∈ (0, 1) and in which the optimistic sender, despite being the most "optimistic" player in the economy, strictly prefers to wait on the grounds that she observes k s instead of k. Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 are not sufficient to rule out those kind of non-monotone candidate continuation equilibria. We decided not to study non monotone equilibria in this paper as we would not expect them to constitute a natural focal point of our game. More research is needed to investigate their existence and their welfare properties. Proof: See appendix. As mentioned above, if Pr(G|b, g) = 1/2, this means that (i) the sender truthfully announced that she is an optimist and (ii) receivers compute their posteriors under the assumption of truthful revelation. For the same reasons as the ones explained above, there exists a MSCE in which only the optimistic receivers randomise at time one. As the investment generates a high surplus, at time one both the optimistic and the pessimistic receivers face a positive gain of investing. Suppose player j anticipates that everyone invests at time one. Player j knows that the sender is an optimist. Thus, she does not expect to learn something about the sender's type by observing her time-one action. Hence, player j only wants to wait to learn something about the other receivers' types. However, the other receivers, independently of their types, also invest at time one. Hence, player j cannot learn by waiting and, due to discounting, prefers to invest at time one.
Proposition 3 If the investment generates a high surplus and if
Note that in this MSCE all receivers possess some public (i.e. the favourable message sent by player i) and some private information (i.e. their signals). All receivers, independently of their signals, rely on the public information by investing at time one. This behaviour is identical to the one followed by the players inside an informational cascade in BHW's (1992) and Banerjee's (1992) models. In those models all players also possess some public (i.e. the action(s) of the first mover(s)) and private information (i.e. their signals) and, independently of their signals, adopt the same action. Therefore, we call the MSCE in which all receivers invest at time one an informational cascade. Chamley (2004a) has shown that this informational cascade does not hinge on our use of a binomial distribution. Rather, it can be recovered under a wide range of distributional assumptions.
The reader may wonder why there does not exist a third MSCE in which only the pessimistic receivers randomise. The answer is simple: that continuation equilibrium is not stable. To understand this, consider Graph 3. Suppose player j is a pessimistic receiver who believes the sender to be optimistic. Graph 3 depicts player j's gain of investing and her gain of waiting as a function of ρ(b, g). If ρ(b, g) = 0, at time two player j will learn how many optimists are present in the economy and her gain of waiting is maximal. If ρ(b, g) = ρ(b, g) = 1, all receivers, independently of their types, invest at time one and player j's gain of waiting is minimal. Graph 3 reveals the existence of a continuation equilibrium in which all pessimistic receivers invest with probability a. More importantly, the graph also shows that player j's gain of waiting is decreasing in ρ(b, g). This is intuitive: when only pessimistic receivers randomise (while the optimistic receivers invest), the act of waiting becomes informative. The higher ρ(b, g), the harder it is to infer n on the basis of k, and the lower a player's gain of waiting. As player j's gain of waiting is decreasing in ρ(b, g), from Graph 4 it is clear that a small increase (decrease) in ρ(b, g) induces player j to increase (decrease) her equilibrium investment probability from a to one (a to zero). Hence, that equilibrium is unstable.
Cheap Talk
We now analyse player i's incentives to truthfully reveal her private information at time zero. One may think about player i in two ways. First, one may interpret player i as a "guru" whose opinion concerning investment matters is often asked by the media. Second, given our assumptions one would want to introduce an opinion poll (instead of just interviewing one player) at time zero. Unfortunately, analytical results are harder to get when one introduces other players at time zero. Therefore one can also interpret our model as one explaining "the economics of opinion polls" under the simplifying assumption that the size of the opinion poll equals one. We first state and prove the following "negative" result.
Proposition 4 For low surplus projects, there exists a unique MSPBE. In that equilibrium the optimistic and the pessimistic sender sendŝ i = g. This MSPBE is supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief that ifŝ i = b, the sender is a pessimist.
Proof: The Proposition is proven in two different steps. First, we prove that σ * (b, h 0 ) must be equal to σ * (g, h 0 ). Next, we explain why σ * (b, h 0 ) = σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1. The proof of the first step appears below. The proof of the second step, which is less insightful, can be found in the appendix. We decided to follow this "two-step procedure" to better highlight the role played by the -reputational cost in our model.
Suppose there exists a MSPBE in which σ * (g, h 0 ) > σ * (b, h 0 ). This can only be an equilibrium if the pessimistic sender does not want to deviate, i.e. if
If the sender sends "I am a pessimist", in our companion paper we have proven that our continuation game is then characterised by a unique MSCE in which σ * (g, b) = 1 and ρ * (g, b) ∈ [0, 1). If the sender sends "I am an optimist", Pr(G|g, g) > p and from Proposition 1 we know that in the continuation game the sender and the pessimistic receivers wait while the optimistic receivers invest with probability ρ * (g, g) ∈ (0, 1). We now argue that ρ * (g, b) < ρ * (g, g). If ρ * (g, b) = 0, it trivially follows that ρ * (g, b) < ρ * (g, g). Therefore, suppose that ρ * (g, b) > 0. In that case both probabilities are solutions of the following system of two equations:
Suppose equality (5) is satisfied. From Lemma 3 then follows that
In the appendix it is proven that
This is intuitive: a receiver's gain of waiting cannot decrease if the sender chooses a more informative time-one strategy. Hence,
and from Lemma 2 then follows that ρ * (g, b) < ρ * (g, g). From Corollary 1 we know that this implies that
The left-hand side of the inequality above represents E(U i |s i = b,ŝ i = b), while the right-hand side represents E(U i |s i = b,ŝ i = g) + . Hence, in the absence of anreputational cost, E(U i |g, b) < E(U i |g, g), which contradicts the necessary condition we identified earlier. As is sufficiently close to zero, the pessimistic sender still strictly prefers to send "I am an optimist" to "I am a pessimist", and, thus, for low surplus projects no information can be transmitted through words. Q.E.D. Intuitively, there does not exist a MSPBE in which σ * (b, h 0 ) < σ * (g, h 0 ) because if player i were to send an unfavourable message, this reduces the optimistic receivers' gain of investing and consequently the equilibrium probability ρ * (g, ·). As it becomes then more difficult for the sender to infer n out of k, this reduces the sender's gain of waiting.
The intuition why σ * (b, h 0 ) = σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1 is based on our -reputational cost. As messages do not affect posteriors, the optimistic sender cannot influence her gain of waiting. To avoid paying , she thus strictly prefers to sendŝ i = g. The pessimistic sender knows that σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1. As argued above, if she sendsŝ i = g, she learns more (about the receivers' types) than by sendingŝ i = b (note, however, that this will be at the expense of her reputation). As → 0, she also strictly prefers to send
Note that Proposition 4 fundamentally relies on the assumption that players can wait and observe the period-one investment decisions. If players were not allowed to observe past investment decisions, our game would be characterised by a unique PBE in which σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1 and σ * (b, h 0 ) = 0. The intuition is simple: if the sender is optimistic she will, independently of her message, invest in the first period. If she is pessimistic she will, independently of her message, not invest. Hence, to save on the -reputational cost, a sender strictly prefers to truthfully report her type. Hence, Proposition 4 shows how the credibility of cheap talk statements can be adversely affected when players can learn through actions. As we mentioned in our introduction, the literature on social learning (see among others Banerjee (1992) , BHW (1992), Chamley and Gale (1994) , Chamley (2004a) ,...) assumes that information only gets revealed through actions. As those models are void of any competition effects, some economists wonder why information should not be revealed through words.
12 Proposition 4 thus provides a justification for the "ad-hoc" omission of a cheap-talk communication channel in many herding models. This paper also possesses a more "positive" result which is summarised below.
Proposition 5 For high surplus projects our game is characterised by two MSPBE's:
a pooling and a separating one. In the separating equilibrium all receivers, independently of their types, invest at time one ifŝ i = g. Ifŝ i = b, the optimistic receivers invest with probability ρ * (g, b), while the remaining players wait. In the pooling equilibrium both sender's types sendŝ i = g. The pooling equilibrium is supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief that ifŝ i = b, the sender is a pessimist.
Proof: The existence of a separating equilibrium is proven below. The existence of a pooling equilibrium is proven in the appendix. Finally, in the appendix we also prove the nonexistence of a MSPBE in which σ
Suppose the investment project is a high surplus one (i.e. c ≤ 1/2) and that all receivers revise their posteriors under the assumption that σ * (b, h 0 ) = 0 and that σ * (g, h 0 ) = 1. Consider first the optimistic sender. From Proposition 2, we know that if she deviates and sendsŝ i = b, her payoff cannot exceed p − c − . If she sendsŝ i = g, from Proposition 3 we know that there exists a continuation equilibrium in which all receivers, along with the optimistic sender, invest at time one. Hence, absent the -reputational cost, an optimistic sender is indifferent between the two messages. If she prefers not to be caught "lying", she strictly prefers to truthfully report her signal. Consider now the pessimistic sender. If she sendsŝ i = b, c ≤ Pr(G|g,ŝ i = b) = 1/2. We now argue that ρ * (g, b) > 0 if c < 1/2. As all receivers know s i at time one, no additional information (about the sender's type) can be learned through the observation of a i . Therefore, a receiver's gain of waiting is independent of σ 1 .
13 Hence, if Pr(G|g, b) = 1/2 > c,
From Graph 1, we know there exists then a unique ρ * (g, b) > 0 such that an optimistic receiver is indifferent between investing and waiting. From Corollary 1 follows that
If the pessimistic sender deviates and sendsŝ i = g, all receivers, independently of their types, invest at time one. As the sender does not receive any payoff relevant information she will not invest and E(U i |s i = b,ŝ i = g) = − . As
a pessimist strictly prefers to reveal her unfavourable information. Q.E.D. The intuition behind our pooling equilibrium (in which both sender's types send the messageŝ i = g) is identical to the one we explained above. In words, a separating equilibrium is fundamentally driven because: (i) both sender's types face different opportunity costs of waiting and (ii) sending a favourable message creates an informational cascade. An optimist believes the investment project is good. For her "time is money" and she is only willing to postpone her investment plans (with probability one) if pessimists don't invest and if optimists invest with a relatively high probability. Unfortunately these two aims cannot be simultaneously achieved by any of the two messages. Therefore, in the presence of an -reputational cost, she strictly prefers to sendŝ i = g. A pessimist believes the investment project is bad. She is unwilling to invest unless she observes "relatively many" optimists investing at time one. If the pessimist were to deviate and sent a favourable message, an informational cascade would occur, she wouldn't receive any payoff-relevant information and she would get zero. Hence, it is the informational cascade which ultimately induces a pessimist to send an unfavourable message. If ρ * (b, h 1 ) would always be equal to zero (as is the case for low surplus projects), a pessimist would never want to send a negative message because -if this message were to be believed -this would reduce ρ * (g, h 1 ). Observe that Proposition 5 also stresses the importance of the informational cascade to elicit private information. There only exist two MSPBE's. There does thus not exist a MSPBE in which σ * (b, h 0 ) < σ * (g, h 0 ) and in which (ρ * (b, g), ρ * (g, g)) = (1, 1). So far we assumed that the sender always possesses private information. In Gossner and Melissas (2003), we allowed for an uninformed sender, in the sense that s i ∈ {b, φ, g}. If s i = φ, the sender's signal is completely uninformative. We assumed that Pr(s i = φ|·) = (where > 0 and → 0) and showed the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium in which the pessimistic and the uninformed sender send the same message (say, messageŝ i = φ) and the optimistic one sends message s i = g. The intuition is similar to the one behind Proposition 5: the pessimistic and the uninformed sender do not want to send the messageŝ i = g as this triggers an informational cascade. The optimistic sender -independently of her messageinvests at time one and prefers to report truthfully for reputational reasons. Hence, one should not interpret Proposition (5) as follows: "informational cascades induce all possible types of players to truthfully reveal their private information". Instead, Proposition (5) should be interpreted as: "informational cascades put an upper limit above which some types of players don't want to misrepresent their information".
Some normative and positive implications of our theory

Should we subsidise investments?
Denote by sub an investment subsidy granted to each period-one investor. Call c ≡ c − sub. A social planner can, by appropriately choosing sub, alter the amount of learning in two different ways. First, by making it relatively more attractive to invest at time one, she can influence all players' gain of waiting in a favourable way. Second, by setting sub such that c ≤ 1/2 < c, she changes the sender's incentives to truthfully reveal her private information (and thus the nature (separating versus pooling) of the equilibrium played in our game). In a full-fledged welfare study, one should compute the value of sub which maximises expected welfare. This exercise, however, is lengthy and outside the scope of this paper. Rather, in this subsection we assume that sub ∈ [− , sub) and highlight some advantages and disadvantages of setting sub = 0. If sub = − (where, as above, represents an arbitrary small, but strictly positive number) this means that the social planner taxes first-period investments. Note that we only allow for a "low" subsidy 14 in the sense that sub < sub ≡ min{sub 1 , sub 2 }, where
and
If sub < sub 1 , this means that the most optimistic type in our model still faces a positive option value of waiting. If sub < sub 2 , this means that 1 − p < c . In the appendix we show that ∀sub ∈ [− , sub), Propositions 4 and 5 are unaffected by the introduction of a first-period subsidy, i.e. if c > 1/2, the unique MSPBE is the pooling one, if c ≤ 1/2 there exists a separating and a pooling equilibrium. We first analyse the case in which the first-period subsidy does not change the nature of the played equilibrium. To illustrate our way of working, suppose the investment project is a high surplus one and that players always focus on the separating equilibrium. As mentioned above, in this equilibrium the message of the sender reveals her type, and strategies of period one are given by: after a good message, everyone invests in period 1, after a bad message, optimistic receivers invest with probability ρ * (g, b), and the remaining players do not invest.
is strictly increasing in sub and ρ * (g, b) < 1.
Proof: See appendix. The intuition behind Lemma 4 is straightforward. We are considering a separating equilibrium. Thus, after the arrival of an unfavourable message, optimistic receivers know they are the only players in the economy who face a positive gain of investing. If an optimistic receiver waits, she forfeits the investment subsidy. Hence, the higher sub, the higher a player's cost of waiting. However, in equilibrium the gain of waiting must equal the cost of waiting, and, thus, the higher sub, the higher a player's gain of waiting (and from Graph 1 we know that this requires a higher ρ * (g, b) ). W el(g, sub, sep) (W el(b, sub, sep) ) denotes the expected payoffs (net of the subsidies received) of the optimistic (pessimistic) players given the first-period subsidy and given that all players focus on the separating equilibrium. For the optimistic players, one has
The first term is given by the expected number of optimists multiplied by their expected utilities. The second is the expected number of optimistic players who invest in period one 15 times the subsidy which is paid to them. This last expression simplifies to
Observe that the second term is strictly positive whenever sub > 0. This finding implies that, from a welfare point of view, a strictly positive subsidy is better (insofar as the optimistic players are concerned) than no subsidy at all. From Lemma 4 we know that (1 − ρ * (g, b))sub (and thus also W el(g, sub, sep)) need not be monotonic in sub. This is intuitive: an increase in sub increases an optimist's gain of waiting, but also reduces the probability that an optimist will wait and effectively benefit from a more informative signal. For pessimists, one has
The first term corresponds to the expected welfare for pessimistic receivers given an optimistic sender. Similarly, the first term between square brackets corresponds to the expected welfare of all pessimistic receivers given a pessimistic sender. The second term between square brackets corresponds to the expected utility of the pessimistic sender. From Lemmas 2 and 4 and Corollary 1 follows that W el(b, sub, sep) cannot 15 With probability 1/2, the sender is pessimistic, in which case 2p(1−p)(N −1) optimistic receivers invest at time one with probability ρ * (g, b); with probability 1/2, the sender is optimistic, in which case (p 2 + (1 − p) 2 )(N − 1) + 1 optimistic players (= conditional expected number of optimistic receivers plus the optimistic sender) invest at time one with probability one. decrease in sub. This is also intuitive: the higher sub, the higher ρ * (g, b) , and, as explained in section 3, this cannot decrease the expected utilities of the pessimistic players. Total social welfare equals W el(sub, sep) = W el(g, sub, sep) + W el (b, sub, sep) .
Suppose now that all players, independently of the surplus generated by the project, focus on the pooling equilibrium. From above, we know that both sender's types then send the messageŝ i = g, that optimists invest with probability ρ * (g, g) and that pessimists do not invest. Note that receiving the messageŝ i = g in the pooling equilibrium is informationally different from receiving the same message in the separating one (and, more importantly, leads to a different behaviour in the continuation game). To avoid confusion, in this subsection we denote by ρ * (g, h 1 ) (respectively ρ * (g, g)) the probability with which all optimists invest at time one in the pooling (respectively separating) equilibrium after having received a favourable message. Here again, we estimate the social welfare separately for optimists and for pessimists (total welfare is denoted by W el(sub, pool)). For optimists, this writes:
For pessimists, we have:
Lemma 5 ∀sub ∈ [0, sub), ρ * (g, h 1 ) is strictly increasing in sub and ρ * (g, h 1 ) < 1.
Proof: See appendix. The intuition is similar to the one behind Lemma 4. As above, W el(g, sub, pool) need not be monotonic in sub, while W el(b, sub, pool) cannot decrease in sub. Our main result is summarised below.
Proposition 6 If the subsidy does not alter the nature of the played equilibrium, any sub ∈ (0, sub) is (strictly) better (for welfare) than no subsidy at all. The relationship between welfare and sub need, however, not be monotonic.
Proposition 6 is not very surprising: because of the information externality the social benefit of investing at time one exceeds the private one. Hence, a social planner fixes sub > 0 to close the gap between both benefits. A similar result is also present in Doyle (2002) . However, it would be premature to conclude that -in the presence of information externalities -investments must always be subsidised as the example below suggests.
Suppose c = 1/2 and that our players focus on the separating equilibrium. We now show that the social planner can increase welfare by imposing an arbitrarily small, but strictly positive, investment tax (i.e. sub = − ). We first compute W el(0, sep). Observe that in the separating equilibrium Pr(G|s j = g,ŝ i = b) = 1/2 = c, and thus there exists a PBE in which ρ * (g, b) = 0. Hence, from equation (6) follows that
and from equation (7) we know that
Adding (10) and (11), one has
This is intuitive: ifŝ i = g, pessimists invest at time one and get a zero payoff. If s i = b, ρ * (g, b) = 0 and our pessimistic players also get a zero payoff. Hence, if c = 1/2 total welfare is only determined by the expected utilities of the optimistic players. Ifŝ i = g, all optimists invest at time one. Ifŝ i = b, optimistic receivers do not invest, but nonetheless obtain the same payoff (i.e. zero) as the one they would obtain if they were to invest at time one. Stated differently, unconditionally investing at time one is -for an optimist -payoff equivalent to the alternative strategy in which she only invests ifŝ i = g. Thus, an optimist gets p − c and, in expected terms, half of the population is optimistic. Thus, welfare equals N/2(p − c).
If sub = − , c > 1/2 and the unique MSPBE is the pooling one. As → 0,
As ρ * (g, h 1 ) > ρ * (g, b) = 0, pessimists benefit from a more informative statistic in the pooling equilibrium and thus W el(0, sep) < W el(− , pool). Our main insight is summarised below.
Proposition 7 An investment tax can -by altering the nature of the played equilibrium -(strictly) increase welfare.
In the analysis above, we restricted ourselves to the case in which c = 1/2. However, it should be clear that Proposition 7 is crucially driven by the fact that when c is close to 1/2 (and c ≤ 1/2) the expected utility of a pessimist hardly exceeds zero in the separating equilibrium. In our introduction we explained why our last insight is not present in Doyle (2002) .
How does the sender's ability influence her incentives for truthful revelation?
So far we assumed that the sender was "as able" as the receivers in the sense that all players possess a signal of the same precision. One may find it more natural to endow player i with a more precise signal. After all, in our model she can be interpreted as a guru and people typically think of them as being better informed.
There is a straightforward way to allow for a better informed sender. Let's assume that player i's signal is drawn from the distribution: Pr(g|G) = Pr(b|B) = r and Pr(b|G) = Pr(g|B) = 1 − r (where 1 > r > p). The higher r, the "smarter" or the better informed the sender. Our main result is summarised below.
Proposition 8 ∀c ∈ (1 − p, min{p,
separating equilibrium. This range of parameter values cannot decrease in the precision of the sender's signal.
Proof: A MSCE in whichρ(b, g) =ρ(g, g) = 1 exists only if Pr(G|b,ŝ i = g) ≥ c. This posterior probability is now computed as:
Using a reasoning identical to the one we outlined above, one can check that, if c ∈ (1 − p,
), there exists a separating equilibrium. Q.E.D. The intuition behind proposition 8 is simple. As we showed in Proposition 5, a separating equilibrium only exists if the sender can make the pessimists change their minds. Proposition 8 therefore rests on the intuitive idea that the "smarter" the sender (or the more precise her private information), the "easier" it will be for her to make the pessimists change their minds. If the sender cannot convince the remaining pessimists to invest at time one (either because the sender is commonly perceived to be "stupid" or because the investment project only generates a low surplus) then she doesn't want to reveal any unfavourable information because this will worsen her second-period inference problem.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced cheap talk in an investment model with information externalities. We first showed that for low surplus projects, the unique MSPBE is the pooling one. This is because a pessimist is reluctant to divulge her bad information as this worsens her second-period inference problem. For high surplus projects, however, there exists a separating equilibrium: as a pessimist doesn't learn anything upon observing an informational cascade (which occurs whenever the sender sends a favourable message) revelation of bad information is compatible with maximising behaviour. A subsidy on low-surplus projects increases welfare, provided the subsidy does not turn a low-surplus project into a high-surplus one. Without an adequate equilibrium selection theory, one cannot appraise the welfare consequences of a policy aimed at subsidising high-surplus projects. Finally, we argued that "smart" people have more incentives to truthfully reveal their private information than "stupid" ones.
The reader must bear in mind that we only introduced cheap talk in an endogenousqueue set-up. More research is thus needed to check the robustness of exogenousqueue herding models to the introduction of cheap talk. In our model one should think about the sender as a famous investor who's being interviewed by the media. We believe it would be equally interesting to consider a set-up in which many players have access to the communication channel through words. In particular, we have two interpretations in mind. First, one could model "the economics of opinion polls" in which a subset of the population is asked to simultaneously send a message to all players in the economy.
16 Second, one could model "the economics of business lunches" in which a subset of the population meet and discuss the investment climate prior to the first investment date (the outcome of the discussion is not divulged to the other players in the economy). We also believe this to constitute an interesting topic for future research.
where c = c − sub, and
where,
In words, ∆ r (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ) denotes a receiver's difference between her gain of waiting and her gain of investing given her posterior, σ 1 , ρ 1 and sub. ∆ s (p, ρ 1 ) denotes the difference between an optimistic sender's gain of waiting and her gain of investing. Note that the sender, when observing k investments, computes her posterior by explicitly taking into account the fact that N − 1 (and not N − 2) players were investing with probability ρ(b, h 1 ) if they were pessimists and with probability ρ(g, h 1 ) if they were optimists. Observe that, as sub ∈ [− , sub) ( > 0 and → 0 and the definition of sub can be found in the body of our paper), 1 − p < c < p.
Proof: As we are focusing on monotone strategies σ(g, h 1 ) − σ(b, h 1 ) ≥ 0. We prove the Lemma in two different steps. First, we show that ∆ r (·) is weakly increasing in σ(g, h 1 ) for any given σ(b, h 1 ) ≤ σ(g, h 1 ). Next, we show that ∆ r (·) is weakly decreasing in σ(b, h 1 ) for any given σ(b, h 1 ) ≤ σ(g, h 1 ).
Step 1: Fix an arbitrary σ(b, h 1 ) ≤ σ(g, h 1 ), and consider two investment probabilities σ(g, h 1 ) < σ (g, h 1 ). Call a i (a i ) the time-one action taken by the sender when h 1 )) ). Having the optimistic sender randomize with probability σ(g, h 1 ) is ex ante identical to the following two-stage experiment: let the optimistic sender invest with probability σ (g, h 1 ). Construct a i then in the following way: if a i = invest, a i = invest with probability
σ (g,h1) , a i = wait with probability 1 − σ(g,h1)
σ (g,h1) , if a i = wait, a i = wait with probability 1.
Hence, a i is a sufficient statistic for a i and from Blackwell's theorem follows that ∀σ(b,
Step 2: Fix an arbitrary σ(g, h 1 ) ≥ σ(b, h 1 ), and consider two investment probabilities σ (b, h 1 ) < σ(b, h 1 ). Call a i (a i ) the time-one action taken by the sender when σ 1 = (σ(b, h 1 ), σ(g, h 1 )) (σ 1 = (σ (b, h 1 ), σ(g, h 1 ))). As above, one can construct a i on the basis of a i in the following way: let the pessimistic sender wait with probability 1 − σ (b, h 1 ).
If a i = wait, a i = wait with probability
a i = invest with probability 1.
As before, a i is a sufficient statistic for a i and from Blackwell's theorem follows that ∀σ(b,
, σ(g, h 1 )), ρ 1 ). Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 ∆ r (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ) is strictly decreasing in q, ∀ρ 1 , ∀σ 1 .
Proof: Consider player l and player l . Both players received the same message from the sender but player l anticipates that Θ = G with probability q, while player l anticipates that Θ = G with probability q . Suppose, without loss of generality, that q > q. Observe that equation (14) Hence, a sufficient condition for (16) to hold is that q − q ≥ W (q , σ 1 , ρ 1 ) − W (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ). (17) Note that the RHS of (17) can be written as:
W (q , σ 1 , ρ 1 ) − W (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ) = (q − q) Using (18) and (19), inequality (17) can be rewritten as (q − q)
x Pr(x|G,ŝ i )(1 − c)(1 − I {Pr(G|q ,x)≥c} ) +(q − q)
x Pr(x|B,ŝ i )c(1 − I {Pr(G|q ,x)≥c} ) ≥ 0, which is obviously satisfied. Using (13), one has ∆ r (q , σ 1 , ρ 1 ) − ∆ r (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ) = δ(W (q , σ 1 , ρ 1 ) − W (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 )) − (q − q).
From above (+ using the fact that δ < 1), it follows that ∆ r (q , σ 1 , ρ 1 ) < ∆ r (q, σ 1 , ρ 1 ), which proves the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof: The proof mirrors the one we outlined in Proposition 10. Whenever ρ(b, h 1 ) < 1 and ρ(g, h 1 ) = 1, the act of waiting becomes informative and the probability with which each pessimist decides to take the informative action equals (1 − ρ(b, h 1 )). Take any two waiting probabilities 1 − ρ(b, h 1 ) > 1 − ρ (b, h 1 ). Call z (z ) the number of players who waited when pessimistic receivers randomised with probability 1 − ρ(b, h 1 ) (1− ρ (b, h 1 )) and optimistic receivers with probability zero. Having N −2 players randomising with probability ρ(b, h 1 ) (if they are pessimists) is ex ante identical to the following two-stage experiment: take N − 2 players and let them wait (if they are pessimists) with probability (1 − ρ(b, h 1 )). Next, take the z non-investors and let them invest with probability 1−ρ (b,h1) 1−ρ(b,h1) . Hence, the statistic z can be constructed by adding noise to the statistic z. In the rest of the proof we always assume that ρ(b, h 1 ) < 1. Whenever Pr(G|q, z, a i ) is well defined one has:
Remark 1: Pr(G|q, z = 0, a i ) > Pr(G|q, z = 1, a i ) > ... > Pr(G|q, z = N − 2, a i ).
Remark 2: Pr(G|q, z = 0, a i ) is strictly decreasing in ρ(b, h 1 ).
Remark 3: Pr(G|q, z, wait) ≤ Pr(G|q, z, invest).
As above, we must distinguish among different cases. If Pr(G|q, z = 0, invest) is well defined and if Pr(G|q, invest) < c, we define ρ c as the probability with which N − 2 receivers must invest (if they are pessimists) such that Pr(G|q, 0, invest) = c. If Pr(G|q, 0, invest) is not well defined and if Pr(G|q, wait) < c, we define ρ c as the probability with which N − 2 receivers must invest (if they are pessimists) such that Pr(G|q, 0, wait) = c. In all the other cases we define ρ c as being equal to one.
If ρ c ≤ ρ(b, h 1 ) < ρ (b, h 1 ) from Remarks 1, 2 and 3 we know that both players never invest at time two and ∆ r (q, σ 1 , (ρ(b, h 1 ), 1)) = ∆ r (q, σ 1 , (ρ (b, h 1 ), 1)). If ρ(b, h 1 ) < ρ (b, h 1 ) ≤ ρ c with a strictly positive probability Pr(G|q, z = N − 2, a i ) < c ≤ Pr(G|q, z = 0, a i ), in which case player 2 wrongly invests (at time two) and loses c − Pr(G|q, z = N − 2, a i ) > 0. Hence, ∀ρ(b, h 1 ) < ρ (b, h 1 ) ≤ ρ c , ∆ r (q, σ 1 , (ρ(b, h 1 ), 1)) > ∆ r (q, σ 1 , (ρ (b, h 1 ), 1)).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 13 ∆ r (q ω , (0, 0), (0, 0)) < 0 < ∆ r (q ω , (0, 0), (0, 1)).
Proof: The fact that ∆ r (q ω , (0, 0), (0, 0)) < 0 trivially follows from our assumption that δ < 1. The second inequality rests on A2 and on the fcat that sub < sub 1 . Q.E.D.
Lemma 14 ∆ r (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)) > 0, ∀q and ∀sub ∈ [− , sub).
Proof: From Lemmas 13 and 7 follows that ∀q and ∀sub ∈ [− , sub), 0 < ∆ r (q ω , (0, 0), (0, 1)) < ∆ r (q, (0, 0), (0, 1)).
Proof of all Lemmas and Propositions in our Paper
The proofs of Lemmas 2, 3 and Corollary 1 can be found above.
Proof of Lemma 1
Call n r the number of optimistic receivers in the economy. Observe that Pr(G|q, n r ) is increasing in n r . As explained in the paper if Pr(G|q ω , n r = 1) = Pr(G|n = 2) < c, then Pr(G|q, n r = 1) < c and W (q, σ 1 , (0, 1)) > q − c ∀q. Hence, we just focus on the question: "How high must N be such that Pr(G|q ω , n r = 1) < c?" The posterior q ω = q ω can only be generated if (i) player i sent a favourable message and (ii) σ(g, h 0 ) = 1 and σ(b, h 0 ) = 0. Therefore if q ω = q ω , n cannot take a value lower than two. Now:
where C 2 N represents the number of possible combinations of two players out of a population of N players. It can easily be shown that ∀N 1 > N 2 ≥ 2:
From statistical textbooks (see e.g. De Groot (1970)) we know that in our set-up Pr(G|n) is driven by the difference between the good and the bad signals in the population. 17 Therefore if N ≥ 5, Pr(G|n = 2) ≤ 1 − p which is strictly lower than c by A1. Q.E.D.
